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INTRODUCTION
The International Satellite Telecommunications Organization
(INTELSAT), an international treaty organization, provides the
space segment for a global satellite telecommunications network.'
In relation to other organizations operating international satellite
telecommunications networks, INTELSAT's structure is unique
because its shareholders are promised a rate of return on invest-
ment capital,2 and it is regulated solely by its shareholders.
Accordingly, the models of economic analysis traditionally applied
to private corporations, regulated monopolies, and nonprofit treaty
organizations, cannot be used to analyze INTELSAT.3
INTELSAT was formed in 1962 at the initiative of the United
States.4 During that period, the Cold War strongly influenced
1. See Richard R. Colino, A Chronicle of Policy and Procedure: The Formulation
of the Reagan Administration Policy on International Satellite Telecommunications, 13
J. SPACE L. 103, 107 (1985).
2. Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organiza-
tion "INTELSAT," Aug. 20, 1971, art. V(c), 23 U.S.T. 3813, 3823, 1220 U.N.T.S. 21,
27 [hereinafter INTELSAT Agreement] (entered into force Feb. 12, 1973).
3. Although INTELSAT shareholders receive a return on investment capital, some
sources describe it as a nonprofit organization. See Colino, supra note 1, at 107; Victoria
E. Fimea & Thomas Mann, Note, INTELSAT, 1 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 413, 413
(1986). To apply the term nonprofit to INTELSAT would mean that every regulated
utility is a nonprofit organization. The INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 2, nowhere
classifies INTELSAT as a nonprofit organization.
4. See Colino, supra note 1, at 103. International telecommunications arrangements
are typically established on the basis of bilateral agreements. MICHAEL K. KELLOGG El
AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 15.5.2 (1992). Initially, only 14 nations
signed the interim agreements that established INTELSAT. Agreement Establishing
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United States foreign policy and it is likely that the primary
purpose behind INTELSAT was to preempt a Soviet international
telecommunications satellite network.- Further, reflecting Presi-
dent Kennedy's goal of placing a man on the moon by the end of
the decade, INTELSAT was intended to stimulate the development
of American space technology.'
Since the first telecommunications satellite was put in orbit,
the market for international satellite telecommunications has grown
at a healthy rate.7 In part because of this growth, several compa-
nies applied to the FCC for licenses to operate international
telecommunications satellites.8
INTELSAT's reaction to the applications went far beyond the
filing of comments with the FCC. Articles authored by attorneys
affiliated with or retained by INTELSAT appeared in law
journals, 9 and Director General Santiago Astrain of INTELSAT
Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite System and
Special Agreement, Aug. 20, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1705, 1743-44, 514 U.N.T.S. 25, 46-47
(entered into force Aug. 20, 1964).
5. "The US realised that if it were to share its satellite technology with other
nations, it could help satisfy the demand for international communications capacity-
reaping a foreign relations windfall and dealing a blow to Soviet global ambitions in the
process." Raul R. Rodriguez, HI: International Telecommunications and Satellite Systems
INTELSAT and Separate Systems: Cold War Revisited, 15 INT'L Bus. LAW. 321, 321
(1987).
6. See JEREMY TUNSTALL, COMMUNICATIONS DEREGULATION 64 (1986).
7. INTELSAT's revenues for the period 1974-84 grew at an annual compound rate
of 15.1%. In re Establishment of Satellite Sys. Providing Int'l Comm., Report and
Order, 101 F.C.C.2d 1046, para. 172 (1985) [hereinafter Separate Systems]. INTELSAT
reported revenues of $457 million for 1985, INTELSAT, 1985-86 ANNUAL REPORT 28
(1986), versus $557 million for 1991, INTELSAT, 1991-92 ANNUAL REPORT 30 (1992)
[hereinafter 1991-92 ANNUAL REPORT], indicating growth at an annual compound rate
of 3.5%. Although these statistics suggest a decrease in growth, capacity was full or near
full on satellites operated by INTELSAT and Pan American Satellite Corporation
(PanAmSat). INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S.
INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 28-9 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK].
INTELSAT's earnings for 1991 were also lower due to the launch failure of an
INTELSAT VI satellite in 1990. See 1991-92 ANNUAL REPORT, supra, at 30.
8. Applicants included Orion Satellite Corporation; International Satellite, Inc.;
Cygnus Satellite Corporation; RCA Communications, Inc.; and PanAmSat. Separate
Systems, supra note 7, para. 2.
9. See Colino, supra note 1; Bert W. Rein et al., Implementation of a U.S. "Free
Entry" Initiative for Transatlantic Satellite Facilities: Problems, Pitfalls, and
Possibilities, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 459 (1985); see also Bert W. Rein
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testified before Congress.' 0 INTELSAT argued that the negoti-
ators of the INTELSAT agreements never contemplated the
entrance of separate systems, that such systems would cause
significant economic harm to INTELSAT, and that INTELSAT
should be the sole arbiter of whether the separate systems should
be allowed." The FCC ultimately rejected INTELSAT's position
and decided to grant licenses for separate systems, subject to
notable restrictions.12
In the 1985 proceeding regarding the entrance of separate
satellite systems, the FCC never squarely addressed whether
INTELSAT's telecommunications traffic between developed
countries, specifically transatlantic traffic between the United
States and Europe, subsidized traffic to remote, less developed
countries. 3 This Comment examines technical and economic
issues that the FCC did not factor into its decision to grant
licenses for international satellite telecommunications systems
separate from INTELSAT. This Comment will demonstrate that no
& Carl R. Frank, The Legal Commitment of the United States to the INTELSAT System,
14 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 219 (1989).
10. The International Telecommunications Act of 1983: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Communications of the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (statement of Santiago Astrain, Director General, INTELSAT).
11. "It is the responsibility of each INTELSAT Party or Signatory to carry out the
obligation to coordinate separate systems under Article XIV(d)." Colino, supra note 1,
at 110.
12. The separate systems were limited to provision of services through the sale or
long-term lease of transponders and could not connect with the public switched network.
Separate Systems, supra note 7, para. 266.
At the time of this writing, INTELSAT continues to experience financial success.
See supra note 7. Moreover, the only separate satellite system currently operating has
been successful. 1992 INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK, supra note 7, at 28-10.
13.
[A] subsidy exists when a product's price does not cover the cost of making
that product .... The price to a purchaser or user of a product or service is
subsidy-free as long as it covers the capital cost, operating expenses, and profit
required to bring that product or service into the marketplace.
Kenneth R. Dunsmore, Dale N. Hatfield Assocs., Issues in International Telecommunica-
tions Pricing and Demand, Nov. 27, 1984, at 8, attached to Comments of Orion Satellite
Corp. in CC Dkt. No. 84-1299 (April 1, 1985) [hereinafter Hatfield Report]. Thus, in the
context of this Comment, a subsidy would occur if INTELSAT transferred income from
the Atlantic Ocean Region (AOR) to support service in the Pacific Ocean Region (POR)
or the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
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technological basis or economic reason exists for a subsidy to flow
from INTELSAT's high volume routes to its low volume
routes.14 Further, competing, separate systems providing satellite
communications could cause INTELSAT economic harm only if
such a subsidy between routes existed. Because such a system of
subsidization does not exist, INTELSAT has continued to enjoy
economic success.
Part I of this Comment provides an introduction to the nature
of satellite communications. Part II demonstrates that INTEL-
SAT's high volume routes do not subsidize low volume routes.
Part III explains why the entrance of separate satellite systems has
not caused INTELSAT economic harm.
I. THE NATURE OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS
A. Earth Station Access to Telecommunications Satellites
Telecommunications satellites are typically placed in
geostationary orbit at a distance of 35,900 kilometers (22,300
miles) above the earth's surface, in the plane that passes through
the earth's equator."5 A satellite in geostationary orbit appears to
remain stationary when viewed from the surface of the earth.'6
The advantage of placing a satellite in geostationary orbit is that
any antenna on the ground can remain stationary while tracking
the satellite. 7
A satellite in geostationary orbit can broadcast radio waves
to 42.4 percent of the earth's surface under the satellite." The
area of coverage is referred to as a "footprint."' 19 To send and
receive signals, the earth station (a dish-shaped satellite antenna)
14. A technological basis for a subsidy would occur if, because of a technological
limitation, the revenues produced in serving an area did not cover the marginal cost of
providing that service.
15. LEON W. COUCH, DIGrrAL AND ANALOG COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 341 (2d
ed. 1987).
16. The orbital location is a function of the satellite's velocity. MARK LONG, WORLD
SATELLITE ALMANAC 4 (2d ed. 1987).
17. COUCH, supra note 15, at 341.
18. LONG, supra note 16, at 41.
19. Id. at 39.
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must be in the satellite's footprint.2" Similar to the beam of light
from a flashlight, the radio signal from a satellite transponder can
be focused to illuminate less than 42.4 percent of the earth's
surface.
The earth station antenna is focused on and transmits radio
signals to the satellite, and the satellite receives and retransmits
the radio signals. If the signal were sufficiently strong, and if the
earth station antenna were focused on the satellite, then an earth
station could receive a transmission from the satellite. If the signal
were not strong enough, the earth station would lose it in
background noise, an effect similar to trying to see a flashlight
from a far distance on a bright day. By increasing the radius of the
earth station antenna, it is still possible to receive a weak
signal.21
B. Technical Compatibility of Earth Stations and Satellite
Equipment
To communicate successfully the earth station must also be
able to broadcast and receive signals that are compatible with the
satellite.22 Many formats are available for using radio signals to
transmit data.23
The sounds created by vocal cords can be converted into a
change in the amplitude or the frequency of a radio signal,24 and
can then be broadcast via satellite. This conversion illustrates the
concept of the analog broadcast format.
The digital transmission format is based on a different
principle. The frequency of a sound is measured a certain number
20. Other limitations of using satellites for telecommunications include (1) the earth
station antenna can only be focused on one satellite at a time, (2) the transmitting and
receiving earth stations must have compatible radio transmission formats, and (3) the two
earth stations must be illuminated by the same satellite to communicate directly with
each other.
21. Dish antenna "gain," or magnification, increases linearly as a function of the
surface area of the dish. See COUCH, supra note 15, at 353.
22. See generally id. at 340-51.
23. See id. at 344-47. Two familiar formats for radio transmission are frequency
modulation (FM) and amplitude modulation (AM).
24. See id. at 211-13.
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of times every second (sometimes called the sampling fre-
quency). If the frequency were measured one thousand times
every second, one thousand pieces of data per second would be
created.26 If this data were later fed into a machine that could
generate these frequencies, it would re-create a sound similar to
the original sound. This is the concept behind the digital format.
The difference between the digital and analog formats is that
analog signals are continuously measured, whereas digital signals
are measured a discrete number of times every second. If ten
thousand pieces of data could be sent over a circuit that carries
one analog signal, but only one thousand pieces of data were
required to digitally re-create the signal, it would be possible to
send ten digital signals over that same circuit.28
The smallest unit of telecommunications typically carried by
satellite is the voice channel, the amount of satellite capacity
required to transmit a single conversation.29 It is possible to
multiplex (mix together) up to 3600 voice channels and transmit
them via satellite transponder.3 ° Smaller volumes of traffic can
be served by different formats. For example, if an earth station
does not handle a large volume of traffic, it would be more
efficient to transmit each voice channel individually, a format
25. See id. at 75-80.
26. This is referred to as the "baud" rate, which is the rate of transmission of the
smallest discrete piece of information. Most digital equipment operates with binary
numbers, where each digit can be either "0" or "1". These digits are referred to as "bits."
If the information were converted to binary digital and transmitted as such, the baud rate
would become the rate at which each binary digit is transmitted. See id. at 82.
27. See id. at 3.
28. The actual digital to analog ratio for voice signals on the INTELSAT VI satellite
is 5:1. See 1991-92 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 17.
29. See generally COUCH, supra note 15, at 344-51.
30. A transponder is any device that takes an input signal, amplifies it, and outputs
the same signal. Some transponders are designed to perform data processing, and might
therefore output an intentionally modified signal. A typical transponder bandwidth is 36
MHz. Other bandwidths are also used. See id. at 342.
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referred to as single channel per carrier (SCPC).31 In the SCPC
format a transponder carries only eight hundred voice channels.32
II. HIGH VOLUME ROuTES Do NOT SUBSIDIZE
Low VOLUME ROuTEs
A. A Basic Satellite Telecommunications System
Consider a basic satellite telecommunications system where
a satellite illuminates two earth stations, the earth stations have
antennae large enough to detect the signal, and they transmit and
receive the data in the appropriate format. The two stations are
able to communicate via the satellite. However, because one
satellite illuminates a maximum of 42 percent of the earth's
surface, to communicate with an earth station outside of the
satellite's footprint, a second satellite must be added to illuminate
the third earth station. The second satellite must illuminate either
the first or second earth stations, which can then relay the message
to the remaining earth station via the first satellite.
Adding a second satellite to the transmission path causes a
considerable delay in the transmission time. Although radio signals
travel at the speed of light, 300,000 kilometers (186,000 miles) per
second, a conversation relayed through two geostationary satellites
must travel more than 150,000 kilometers (93,000 miles) from the
sender to the receiver, and the same distance back to the sender.
This results in a noticeable and annoying delay, and requires twice
as much satellite capacity. Thus, transmission through two satellite
links is avoided, even though feasible.
Two satellites could connect one location, for example New
York, to over 80 percent of the earth's surface. However, the same
is not true for all locations connected to New York. A location to
the west of New York, such as Mexico City, would not be able to
communicate directly with a location to the east, such as Dublin.
31. INTELSAT uses a system identified by the acronym SPADE to carry individual
voice channels. Id. at 347. SPADE is an acronym for Single channel per carrier, Pulse
code modulation, multiple Access, Demand assignment Equipment. Id.
32. See id.
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A third satellite would be required, or else the Mexico City to
Dublin connection would require twice the satellite resources of
the New York to Mexico City or Dublin connection. Another
alternative would be to route part of the call over land from New
York to Mexico City, or over submarine cable from New York to
Dublin, although the quality of the call would be somewhat
diminished. The ideal connection would be direct via satellite from
Mexico City to Dublin.
This scenario illustrates why there is no technological reason
for a subsidy to flow from a route carrying heavy traffic, such as
the United States to Europe, to a route carrying light traffic, such
as from Mexico City to Dublin. A technological basis for a
subsidy would occur if a separate satellite were necessary to
provide service for the light traffic route only because the heavy
traffic route could not service both the light and heavy routes. In
such a case, the subsidy would exist only as long as the satellite
covering the light traffic route has more excess capacity than the
satellite covering the heavy traffic route.
Returning to the example, if a third satellite were needed only
to carry communications between Mexico City and Dublin, and if
these communications did not use all of the satellite's capacity,
then the two satellites serving New York would subsidize the third
satellite. If all three satellites were used to full capacity, no
subsidy would exist. If either or both of the satellites serving New
York were below capacity and the third satellite were used at a
greater capacity, a subsidy would then flow from the third satellite
to the satellites serving New York.
B. Flexibility in System Design
INTELSAT and other satellite operators routinely redeploy
satellites to other orbits.33 The location and size of the earth
station antennae and the volume of member state telecommunica-
33. See William Harwood, Titan 3 Rocket Primed for Launch, UPI, Mar. 13, 1990,
available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File; Margaret M. Petronchak & Waiter L.
Morgan, Communications Center, C-Band Geostationary Satellite Locations, SATELLITE
COMM., Dec. 1990, at 35.
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tions traffic must be coordinated when satellites are added,
replaced, or redeployed. A perfect system would establish all
desired communications links and would distribute communica-
tions traffic as evenly as possible, accommodating the daily and
seasonal fluctuations in traffic volume and allowing traffic to be
rerouted easily. Redeployment allows INTELSAT to equate more
closely marginal costs and marginal revenues, minimizing any
potential subsidy. Although the loss of transatlantic traffic would
require INTELSAT to redeploy satellite resources, and perhaps
downsize its fleet of satellites, such changes would not necessarily
cause INTELSAT to raise its rates.
C. Heavy Route Users Will Initially Pay for a Decrease
in Volume
Even if INTELSAT experienced a loss of telecommunications
traffic due to the entrance of separate systems and could not
efficiently restructure its system, the price charged for the space-
segment portion of the call for all users would not necessarily
increase. A transponder carrying multiplexed voice channels can
carry up to 3600 channels, but it must also operate with less
volume in response to daily and seasonal variations in traffic. The
immediate effect from a loss of transatlantic traffic would be a
gradual loss in total traffic, but there would still be periods of
heavy use. The transponders used by the Communications Satellite
Corporation (COMSAT), which provides the uplink to the satellite,
and other INTELSAT shareholders in this region might experience
decreasing levels of use, which could ultimately require these
users to decrease the total number of transponders used in this
region. Nevertheless, the higher costs of operating the transponders
resulting from decreasing traffic volume will be borne only by
these INTELSAT shareholders, and not by any other INTELSAT
shareholders. Eventually, these shareholders would coordinate with
INTELSAT to decrease the total number of transponders that they
use in the AOR.
[Vol. 46
Number 2] TELECOMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE SYSTEMS 339
III. WHY THE ENTRANCE OF SEPARATE SATELLITE SYSTEMS
WILL NOT CAUSE INTELSAT ECONOMIC HARM
A. A Refutation of INTELSAT's Subsidy Argument
In their comments to the FCC, three parties contended that
separate systems would increase the cost of INTELSAT's service
to developing countries. The commenters alleged that allowing the
entrance of separate systems in the AOR would divert revenue
from INTELSAT and increase the cost to developing nations of
using INTELSAT.34
INTELSAT asserted two arguments in support of its conten-
tions. First, it argued that the original parties to the INTELSAT
agreements intended that no competing service be established in
the transatlantic region. Second, INTELSAT argued that because
of INTELSAT's pricing structure, any loss of traffic in the
transatlantic region would increase the cost of services as a whole.
1. Critique of INTELSAT's Policy Argument
INTELSAT's first argument, that the original signatories to
the INTELSAT agreements did not contemplate the entrance of
separate systems, was simply a policy argument. This argument
was based in part upon Article XIV(d) of the INTELSAT
agreement. Article XIV(d) states:
To the extent that any Party or Signatory or person within the
jurisdiction of a Party intends individually or jointly to establish,
acquire or utilize space segment facilities separate from the
INTELSAT space segment facilities... such Party or Signatory.
* shall consult with the Assembly of Parties ... to avoid signifi-
cant economic harm to the global system of INTELSAT.35
INTELSAT used this provision to support its position that it
had the sole authority to determine whether separate systems
would cause economic harm to INTELSAT. INTELSAT deter-
mined that loss of transatlantic service would create a loss of
34. Separate Systems, supra note 7, para. 200.
35. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 2, art. XIV(d), 23 U.S.T. at 3854, 1220
U.N.T.S. at 41.
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revenue, and cause the cost of all services to rise, which would
cause INTELSAT significant economic harm.3
6
The existence and further development of submarine cables
clearly demonstrates the shortcoming of INTELSAT's policy
argument. The original INTELSAT agreements did not mention
submarine cables even though five transatlantic cables had been
laid before the signing of the agreements. The cables carried
approximately the same number of circuits as the entire INTEL-
SAT network at that time.37 If INTELSAT truly intended to have
the exclusive role for transatlantic satellite telecommunications, it
seems unlikely that the signatories would have completely
overlooked controls on the amount of traffic carried by transatlan-
tic cable. Therefore, it would seem that the United States did not
envision an exclusive role for INTELSAT for transatlantic
telecommunications.
2. Critique of INTELSAT's Economic Assertions
INTELSAT's second argument, that a loss of transatlantic
telecommunications traffic would result in higher costs, was a
blanket assertion.
INTELSAT could not prove the existence of a subsidy.38
36. Colino, supra note 1, at 114.
37. See Hatfield Report, supra note 13, at 23, tbl. 3. Additional cables have been
laid since that time. The first fiber-optic cable was TAT-8, which went into service in
1988 with the capacity to carry 40,000 voice channels. First Transoceanic Fiber-Optic
Cable, PR Newswire, Dec. 14, 1988, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
The latest planned fiber-optic cable pair, TAT-12/TAT-13, will be capable of carrying
320,000 voice channels. Self-Restoring Fiber: AT&T Leading Owner of First Self-
Restoring Fiber Optic Network in the Atlantic, Business Wire, Dec. 16, 1992, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Bwire File. Fiber-optic cable has siphoned off an increasingly
large amount of INTELSAT's transatlantic business without affecting the ability of
INTELSAT to operate successfully a global satellite telecommunications network.
38. INTELSAT submitted with its comments a report explaining the difficulty of
determining the existence of a subsidy.
More importantly, our overall examination of INTELSAT operating and cost
characteristics clearly demonstrates the inherent misdirection and futility of any
attempt to identify and/or measure INTELSAT cross-subsidies through such
cost-allocation methods. The simple fact is that most of INTELSAT's costs are
inherently unallocable among regions, routes or users.
Walter Hinchman Assocs., Inc., 1 The Economics of International Satellite Communica-
tions (Summary Report), in FCC Dkt. No. 84-1299, at 17 (May 18, 1984) (on file with
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However, INTELSAT implied that such a subsidy existed, based
upon the conventional perception that a route carrying heavy
traffic should realize economies of scale and produce more profit
than a route carrying light traffic.
INTELSAT based this argument on an interpretation of
Article V(d) of the INTELSAT agreement.3 ' Article V(d) states:
All users of the INTELSAT space segment shall pay utilization
charges determined in accordance with the provisions of this
Agreement and the Operating Agreement. The rates of space
segment utilization charge for each type of utilization shall be the
same for all applicants for space segment capacity for that type of
utilization.4"
Interpreted incorrectly, the phrase "for each type of utilization"
could be taken to mean that the charge for each channel of voice
communications would be the same, regardless of the format used
to transmit the channel. However, as explained previously, certain
formats carry a greater number of voice channels or other data.
INTELSAT categorizes different formats as different "types of
utilization" and charges for service based upon the owner's use of
transponders, rather than based upon the amount of data trans-
ferred.41 Stated simply, INTELSAT's yearly operating costs are
divided by the number of transponders utilized, yielding the cost
charged for using one transponder for the entire year. These costs
are adjusted to account for differences in transponder capacity
(bandwidth) and total system use. If one owner used fewer
transponders and all other owners' usage remained unchanged, the
cost of service per transponder for all users would increase over
the short term.
Ambassador Abbott Washburn testified that the entrance of
separate transatlantic systems would siphon off revenue from and
the Federal Communications Law Journal).
39. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 2, art. V(d), 23 U.S.T. at 3823, 1220
U.N.T.S. at 27.
40. Id.
41. See Walter Hinchman Assocs., Inc., 2 The Economics of International Satellite
Communications (Supporting Analysis and Workpapers), in FCC Dkt. No. 84-1299, at
HI-1 to 111-4 (May 18, 1984) (explaining how INTELSAT uses a global average of its
costs to determine cost per transponder) (on file with the Federal Communications Law
Journal).
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do harm to INTELSAT.42 Washburn asserted that entrance of
separate systems would be a challenge to a unique system that
linked together nations and "provide[d] universal access on a non-
discriminatory basis. 43
The FCC made several findings regarding the economic
arguments raised by INTELSAT and the separate system appli-
cants. The FCC noted that it was difficult to quantify the existence
of a subsidy.' Further, the FCC concluded that INTELSAT was
a financially stable organization, and that limited competition
would not cause INTELSAT significant economic harm.4 1 The
FCC determined that restricting the separate systems from markets
that provided significant revenue to INTELSAT would adequately
protect INTELSAT.46 The FCC did not conclude that separate
systems could not cause economic harm to INTELSAT; rather, the
determinations reflected the FCC's belief that the United States
would continue to support INTELSAT.
B. Analysis of the Impact of Separate Systems on INTELSAT
1. The Cream-Skimming Argument
INTELSAT's argument against the proposed separate systems
was the classic "cream-skimming" argument.47 Cream-skimming
42. International Communication and Information Policy: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and Environment of the
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 98th Cong., 1st. Sess. 160 (1983) [hereinafter Communica-
tion Hearings] (statement of Ambassador Abbott Washburn, former Commissioner, FCC,
former Ambassador and Chairman, U.S. Delegation to 1983 Regional Administrative
Radio Conference Direct Broadcasting Satellite Service).
43. Id. at 159.
44. Separate Systems, supra note 7, para. 200 n.139.
45. Id. para. 265.
46. Id.
47. Regulated monopolies are vulnerable to cream-skimming because "if entry is
free, competitors will naturally choose to come into only the lucrative markets,
'skimming the cream' of the business, negligently leaving to the established common
carriers the burden of providing continuing service to the poorer and thinner markets
.... 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND
INSTITUTIONS 7 (1971).
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requires the presence of a regulated monopoly,48 and cannot
occur in a competitive market or if a service is not provided by a
monopolist.49 The cost of service for some users (the burdened
market) is priced above marginal cost in order to create a surplus
of revenue, which is used to subsidize services that would be
prohibitively expensive for other customers if priced at marginal
cost. In this situation, competitors in the burdened market could
price their services above marginal cost, but below the cost the
monopoly provider must charge in order to subsidize the unprofit-
able market.
Telecommunications was initially considered a natural
monopoly because of the large capital costs required to install
residential phone service." However, in the United States, the
subsidies created by the monopolized telecommunications services
did not follow a cognizable pattern and may have subsidized
parties not intended to receive a subsidy." The condition per-
sisted in large part because of the sparsity of data provided by
AT&T that might have demonstrated that some telecommunica-
tions services, such as long-distance, are not natural monopo-
lies. 2 The rise of a competitive long-distance telecommunications
market indicates that long-distance telecommunications service is
not a natural monopoly.
2. Traditional Models of Economic Analysis Cannot Be Applied
to INTELSAT
The problem with applying a cream-skimming analysis to the
proposed entrance of separate systems is that INTELSAT is not a
regulated natural monopoly. INTELSAT is an international
48. A natural monopoly is said to exist when the cost for a product would be lower
if there were a single supplier. Regulation is required only to simulate the effects of
competition. 2 id. at 2.
49. See 2 id. at 2, 7. In a free market, cream-skimming is simply competition. If a
monopoly were artificially created, competition could only result from a change in the
circumstances that created the monopoly. If a monopoly were not regulated, any limited
competition could be underpriced by the monopoly provider.
50. See TUNSTALL, supra note 6, at 90-91.
51. See id. at 92.
52. See id.
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cooperative owned by the nations or designated telecommunication
companies that are signatories to the INTELSAT Agreement. 3
The owners of INTELSAT are typically the monopoly providers
of postal, telephone, and telegraph (PTT) services for the signatory
countries.54
In order to understand the economics of INTELSAT, it is
necessary to understand how INTELSAT interacts with the owners
of the system. When a customer places a phone call requiring the
services of INTELSAT, the customer must deal with the organiza-
tion that owns INTELSAT for the customer's country. This
company is typically a PTT." The country receiving the call has
a similar arrangement for routing the call from the downlink (the
earth station receiving the call) to the party receiving the call.
Under this system, at least three companies are involved in
the completion of an international call. The charge for the call is
split between the two terrestrial companies,56 who must later pay
for INTELSAT's services. The charge for the space segment of
the call can be nearly 10 percent of the cost of the call between
two countries with well-developed terrestrial networks.5 7 INTEL-
SAT's services are an indirect cost to the user and a relatively
fixed cost to the service provider.
C. INTELSAT's Pricing Structure Prevents the Creation of
a Subsidy
Assuming that INTELSAT were correct, and cream-skimming
by the separate systems could occur, it cannot be shown that
service to developing countries actually burdens INTELSAT. A
service would burden INTELSAT if the revenue derived from
53. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 2, preamble, 23 U.S.T. at 3814-15, 1220
U.N.T.S. at 22-24; id. art. II, 23 U.S.T. at 3818, 1220 U.N.T.S. at 25.
54. See KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 4, §§ 15.3.2, 15.6.1-.4.
55. In the United States, a second company provides this connection to COMSAT,
the company designated by the United States under the INTELSAT Agreement.
INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 2, art. II(b), 23 U.S.T. at 3818, 1220 U.N.T.S. at 25.
56. KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 4, § 15.5.2.
57. See Communication Hearings, supra note 42, at 35 (statement of Richard R.
Colino, Director General-Designate, INTELSAT).
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providing the service did not cover the service's marginal cost. 8
However, INTELSAT's pricing structure does not differentiate
between service to remote countries and service to developed
countries. All countries are charged the same unit cost for the type
of service regardless of volume 9 because the system does not
make pricing distinctions based on the origin of the signal.
Therefore, it cannot be shown that low volume routes burden high
volume routes.
INTELSAT argued not that service on the "light routes" did
not cover marginal cost, but rather that any loss of utilization must
result in greater marginal costs per user. ° The argument did not
account for the organization's flexibility to respond to changes in
demand. Further, INTELSAT did not establish that the markets
served by separate systems would consist of telecommunications
traffic that was previously carried by INTELSAT.
The proposed separate systems were initially licensed to
provide telecommunications services between discrete locations.6'
The services would bypass the companies providing the public-
switched terrestrial network, transmitting such data as financial
market data, news, and intercorporate communications. Because
the owners of INTELSAT are typically the companies that would
also stand to lose revenues to the separate systems, it is likely that
the objections raised by INTELSAT were not based upon the loss
of revenues to INTELSAT, but rather upon the loss of revenues
to the PTTs and other INTELSAT owners.
CONCLUSION
As a result of the growth in the telecommunications market
and the continued prosperity of INTELSAT, INTELSAT's claims
of imminent economic harm have rung hollow. This Comment
58. 2 KAHN, supra note 47, at 221.
59. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 2, art. V(d), 23 U.S.T. at 3823, 1220
U.N.T.S. at 27.
60. See Colino, supra note 1, at 113-14.
61. The separate systems were restricted to services that do not connect with the
public switched network. Separate Systems, supra note 7, para. 265.
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clarifies why INTELSAT and its members have not suffered the
predicted economic harm.
First, the separate systems have not caused INTELSAT
economic harm because no technical reason exists for high volume
routes to subsidize low volume routes. By redeploying satellites,
INTELSAT can accommodate changes in traffic without causing
a decrease in satellite utilization. Second, INTELSAT has not
suffered economic harm from the separate systems because
INTELSAT is not a regulated monopoly that must subsidize
services to certain users. A decrease in traffic on high volume
routes would cause only a short term increase in the price of
service for those customers.
The FCC announced that the restrictions placed on the
separate systems will be removed by 199762 In response to the
FCC's decision, COMSAT's Chairman and CEO stated in a press
release, "Everybody wins with this decision. ' 63 The press release
further noted that "COMSAT has led the fight to bring the
advantages of increased competition to INTELSAT." ' While the
latter assertion may seem disingenuous in light of the INTELSAT
members' unanimous resolution against the entrance of separate
systems,65 this change in position reflects INTELSAT members'
acceptance of the conclusions presented in this Comment.
62. In re Permissible Servs. of U.S. Licensed Int'l Comm. Satellite Sys. Separate
from the Int'l Telecomm. Satellite Org. (INTELSAT), Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 2313, para.
6 (1992).
63. COMSAT Says "Everybody Wins" with Government Decision to Liberalize
Satellite Telephone Restriction, Business Wire, Nov. 27, 1991, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Bwire File.
64. Id.
65. Colino, supra note 1, at 115, 122-23.
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